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Abstract
At present, very little is known about what might encourage children and teens to limit access to their private information online
and to restrict what they share on social media and video sites. Federal and state agencies face challenges encouraging companies
to help children, teens, and parents protect their information online. The authors extend previous cognitive defense research by
examining (1) effects beyond advertising as applied to information privacy online; (2) not only children’s/teens’ beliefs and
knowledge, but also their online privacy decisions; (3) multiple age categories; (4) multiple cognitive defense strategies (educational video, quiz with feedback, or absence of a strategy); and (5) children’s/teens’ motivation to restrict what they share online.
Key results indicate significant effects of the quiz and educational video over the absence of a strategy in enhancing favorable
online safety beliefs and in restricting online sharing. Findings also demonstrate the role of perceived parental influence and for
agencies to offer privacy education campaigns to help empower children to protect their privacy. Implications for policy and
privacy research are discussed.
Keywords
children, privacy, cognitive defenses, active protection, (self) regulation

Children and Teens Online: A Privacy
Problem
Currently, 95% of teens have access to a smartphone, and 45%
report that they are online “almost constantly” (Pew Research
Center 2018). Children’s and teens’ online use has reached
record highs, with youth aged 5–15 years spending over 15
hours each week online—overtaking time spent watching traditional TV (Ofcom 2017). Even preschoolers, aged 3–4 years,
are spending almost eight hours per week online. Parents also
are spending a great deal of time online, and some admit that
they also struggle with the allure of screens and are increasingly distracted by their devices (Pew Research Center 2018).
Given this almost incessant online activity for many, several
questions and challenges emerge. Are children, teens, and parents protecting their online data themselves, and if so, how are
they protecting their personal information during online
exchanges? If they are not protecting their online information,
who is or who should? Are there ways to empower children and
teens regarding their online safety knowledge and behaviors? Is
it better to have children learn online safety themselves or have
parents enforce safety measures? We examine these issues

experimentally by testing whether certain cognitive defense
strategies (e.g., an educational video, a quiz with feedback)
versus an absence of a strategy will help children and teens
improve (1) their beliefs about online safety and (2) their decisions to restrict the sharing of videos online. Our focus is on
one of the most popular social media sites for children and
teens today: YouTube. Our contribution extends prior research
on the use of cognitive defense strategies (cf. Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 1988; John 1999; Rozendaal, Buijzen,
and Valkenburg 2009) by focusing on information privacy
(vs. advertising) and by our testing of specific online safety
beliefs and decisions, multiple age categories, and multiple
defense strategies, as well as accounting for children’s and
teens’ motivation to restrict access and sharing. We also examine whether children’s and teens’ perceived parental
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restrictions on their online viewing and sharing vary by age.
Understanding this process of empowerment can help federal
and state agencies and marketers improve regulatory efforts to
better protect the online privacy of children and teens.

Children’s Online Behavior, YouTube, and
Company Responses
The privacy of children and teens, and the information collected from them online, represents one of parents’ top concerns today (Anderson 2019). There is good reason for this
concern, as across all social network profiles, only 61% of
youth aged 10–18 years have enabled the privacy settings to
protect their content, and 52% do not turn off their location or
GPS services across apps, leaving their locations visible to
others (McAfee 2014). In addition, 14% posted their home
addresses online—a 27% increase from the previous year’s
results. Even with the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC)
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (FTC 1998 and
updates), a study of online children’s apps showed that more
than 50% of the apps failed to protect the children’s data (Egelman 2017). Recently, operators of the children’s app Musical.ly (also known as Tik Tok) agreed to pay $5.7 million to
settle FTC charges that they violated the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule by collecting personally identifiable
information from children through the app (U.S. v. Musical.ly
and Musical.ly, Inc. 2019). Also, gaming chat apps (e.g., Discord) have been singled out for their lack of age verification
and violent messaging and content from users aimed at children
and teens (Jargon 2019). Finally, Google’s YouTube agreed to
a $170 million settlement with the FTC and New York Attorney General based on a complaint that YouTube collected
personal information from children for use in behavioral advertising delivered to viewers of children’s channels on YouTube
(FTC 2019; U.S. and New York Attorney General 2019).
YouTube represents the most popular site for children and
teens to view video content, with 73% of those aged 5–15 using
the site (Ofcom 2017) and an even higher percentage for teens
in general at 85% (Pew Research Center 2018). Google’s
YouTube is of particular interest for research about children
and privacy because it offers two different sites with different
target segments. One is considered a “general site” and is
directed toward consumers over the age of 13, whereas the
other site, YouTube Kids, was introduced in 2015 for children
preschool age and older. In 2018, a coalition of consumer
advocacy groups complained that YouTube has known that
children aged 12 and younger access the general site (instead
of YouTube Kids), accusing YouTube of violating the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (COPPA
1998). As previously noted, this resulted in Google’s
YouTube settling with the FTC and New York Attorney
General for the largest COPPA penalty since Congress
enacted the law in 1998 (FTC 2019).
Although parents claim they check what their teens and
children do online and post on social media (Anderson
2019), recent reviews of the most popular video websites
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(e.g., YouTube) indicate that child protection mechanisms are
breaking down (Wendling 2017). For example, YouTube’s
volunteer “Trusted Flaggers1” report that of 526 complaints
made to YouTube’s public reporting abuse page, only 15
responses were received back from the service (Wendling
2017). The reports were made primarily against accounts that
left objectionable comments (often sexually explicit) on videos
made by young teenagers and children. As a result, YouTube
promised to increase its transparency with users about how it
flags videos and handles reports about flagged videos. The first
“Community Guidelines Enforcement Report,” covering the
last quarter of 2017, indicates that the general site (i.e., not
YouTube Kids) removed approximately 8.2 million videos during that period (Shu 2018). Some consumer advocacy groups
have noted that although “YouTube Kids may be more ‘kidfriendly’ than YouTube itself,” the site is “still technically a
portal to the main YouTube service,” which contains a considerable amount of questionable content (Common Sense Media
2018). In essence, privacy protection (i.e., control and access to
personal information) is still primarily the responsibility of
parents and the children themselves. Empowering children to
set limits for their online interactions is a key factor, especially
for those on YouTube. Our study contributes to these areas by
examining what types of cognitive defense strategies can be
effective at improving online safety beliefs for children and
teens and, in turn, helping them to restrict the sharing of private
information.

Regulatory Efforts in Protecting Children’s
Online Privacy
Since 1997, the Federal Trade Commission (1997) and industry
self-regulatory guidelines for children (Children’s Advertising
Review Unit (CARU) 1997), have recommended providing (1)
full and effective notice or disclosure (e.g., regarding the information collected, how it will be used, information access), (2)
parental or guardian consent, (3) parental or guardian choice
(access) with respect to the information collected, and (4)
future privacy protection (security) for children. These four
privacy principles are now enforced as part of the FTC’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (FTC 1998; emanating
from the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act or
“COPPA” 1998), which applies to any website collecting data
from children under age 13 in the United States. COPPA offers
guidelines for websites targeting children to ensure parental
consent for children aged 13 and under; however, a loophole
exists for websites that target general audiences, which children may still access. California recently addressed this loophole with The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (AB
375), which extends the protection to children/teens under age
1

“YouTube Trusted Flagger program was developed by YouTube to help
provide robust tools for individuals, government agencies, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are particularly effective at
notifying YouTube of content that violates [the] Community Guidelines.”
(support.google.com).
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16 and requires prior parental permission for sites to collect
children’s data. Either way, this type of regulation and legislation focuses on protecting the data gathered and advertising
delivered to users on websites targeting children, rather than
constraining the amount of data gathered. This represents an
important distinction affecting the ability of parents and children to protect their exchanged information.
Since COPPA (1998, with 2012 amendments included) and
AB 375, there have been privacy workshops and conferences
(PrivacyCon) almost every year at the FTC centered on these
issues (e.g., “Putting (Privacy) Disclosures to the Test,” FTC
2016). Although these privacy principles, workshops, and conferences are intuitively appealing, very little research has been
conducted to examine how children and teens actually respond
to privacy disclosure information and education.2 This is a
significant gap in research, as children and parents are increasingly relying on devices and online connections to give them
the power to accomplish tasks and assist with daily responsibilities. Thus, important questions remain regarding how children store, retrieve, and make choices regarding their online
information (e.g., parental permission), warning information
(e.g., not to post full names, phone numbers, email addresses),
and restrictions to content posted. In this study, we examine
experimentally whether cognitive defense strategies (e.g., an
educational video, a quiz with feedback) will positively influence children’s online privacy knowledge and willingness to
place conditions on what they might share and whether they
restrict access to videos watched. First, we discuss research on
what motivates children’s and teens’ (online) decision making
and why they often resort to risk taking. Then, we present
efforts to help reduce such (online) risk taking, such as the
active setting of privacy controls through cognitive defense
strategies.

Children’s and Teens’ (Online) Decision
Making
Research has shown that children and adolescents (aged 13–17
years) are more impulsive, self-conscious, prone to risk taking,
and more vulnerable to harm than adults (Pechmann et al.
2005; Steinberg 2020). A primary reason for this is the rapid
development and plasticity of the brain in these formative years
(Pechmann et al. 2005). The release of dopamine plays an
important role in adolescent neural activity in response to novel
stimuli and rewards (e.g., social media postings, comments and
likes, text pings, Twitter bird whistles). As such, adolescent
choices are driven more by rewards during this period than
by an evaluation of risks (Steinberg and Scott 2003). For example, research has shown that adolescents (aged 13–17) have
significantly higher intentions to take online risks (e.g., disclosing personal information, making unknown friends online) than
2

Research on children also can be challenging because they are considered a
specially protected group (i.e., academic research requires approval from an
institutional review board).
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young adults (aged 18–24) (White et al. 2015). One reason for
this is that the prefrontal cortex, important for inhibitory control and objective risk assessment, is not fully developed until
late adolescence. Moreover, the skills required to control urges
found in adolescence are not developed until later—often leading to risky decisions (Pechmann et al. 2005).
Fitting in socially is an additional pressure that children and
adolescents often face online. Peer influence, often manifested
through social media, is at its strongest in early adolescence
and only slowly declines in high school (Steinberg and Scott
2003). Due to this period of impulsivity, sensation seeking,
self-consciousness, and peer influence, adolescents are particularly vulnerable to making poor decisions, leading to an elevated risk of addiction (e.g., social media) and other abuses
(Andrews and Netemeyer 2015; Pechmann et al. 2005). Adolescents also are shown to be more susceptible to advertising
imagery and consumption symbols for harmful products (cf.
Pechmann and Knight 2002; Pollay et al. 1996). Ideally, the
development of one’s knowledge of advertising tactics and
appeals (i.e., persuasion knowledge; Friestad and Wright
1994) can help reduce such susceptibility. However, as noted
by Friestad and Wright (1994), such persuasion knowledge,
involving more abstract, skeptical, multidimensional, and less
absolute thinking, only begins to form in adolescence and
develops slowly. Also, in the study of adolescent online risk
taking, White et al. (2015) find that verbatim (absolute) representations correlate positively with online risk intentions,
whereas gist (meaning) representations correlate negatively
with such online risk intentions. So, how is such online knowledge and meaning developed by children and adolescents? The
answer may lie in the development and activation of privacy
protection (Walker 2016), digital/media literacy (Hobbs 2011;
Pechmann et al. 2005), and/or cognitive defense strategies
(Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 1988) to empower children
and adolescents online.

Active Versus Passive Privacy Protection
Efforts to encourage active (vs. passive) privacy protection by
educating parents and children about privacy issues have
become more prominent recently. As such, privacy education
is encouraged strongly by industry and public policy to achieve
what is considered “digital literacy” (Hobbs 2011). Digital
literacy involves not only the ability (for youth) to understand
the risks involved when providing information online but also
to understand immediate dangers involving other people, such
as cyberbullying, stranger danger, etc. COPPA is an attempt to
address the general issue of the collection and use of information by websites, apps, and platforms. But, as discussed previously, COPPA is limited to children under age 13 (16 and under
in California) and only requires sites to obtain parental permission to gather data. Industry efforts tend to focus on complying
with COPPA and ensuring websites avoid collecting personal
information and engaging in online behavioral advertising
when such sites have “actual knowledge” that users are under
the age of 13 (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2015, p. 5). The
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in audio and video—in affecting awareness, comprehension,
knowledge acquisition, and recall of information (cf. Hoy and
Andrews 2004). This superiority assumes that dual modality
enhances one’s depth of message processing in contrast to a
single mode of presentation (i.e., either solely in audio/written
form or only in video form; Paivio 1969). But, again, dual
modality is still only an enhancement in a condition of passive
(vs. active) privacy protection.
Overall, the SSIM extends the level of protection beyond
passive and acknowledges a difference in how much people
trust their online interactions. Yet, in our study, we focus on
how to activate cognitive defense strategies in children that will
encourage them to place conditions on their exchanges of information in the hope that they will become active in their privacy
protection.

PASSIVE Protection Behavior
Figure 1. Consumer information privacy: The sharing–surrendering
information matrix. Source: Walker (2016).

Cognitive Defense Strategies to Improve
Privacy Knowledge and Decisions

purpose of improving one’s digital literacy is to strengthen the
competence and understanding of digital knowledge, skills, and
attitudes, including the protection of personal information
exchanged. Using strategies to strengthen children’s cognitive
defenses supports digital literacy efforts to help them protect
their privacy online.
To aid in research and discussion on active privacy protection, Walker (2016) portrays the uncertainty about the
exchange of information and the levels of privacy protection
in a 2  2 matrix of sharing–surrendering information (SSIM;
see Figure 1). In the SSIM, privacy protection levels are displayed along a continuum of active or passive based on how
many conditions individuals use, place, enact, etc. when
exchanging information. An individual who is active in their
privacy protection may place conditions on their exchanges by
using privacy settings, employing different email accounts for
app use, viewing online content with private mode(s), etc.
When an individual is passive in their protection and does not
place conditions on their online exchanges of information, they
are unconditionally exchanging information.
As an example of passive protection and unconditional sharing, consider the situation in which a child/teen downloads a
new app on a smartphone and quickly checks the privacy terms
box assuming there is no harm from the app’s collection of
information. Unfortunately, improving the ability of individuals to process and actively protect privacy often has been relegated to the assumed reading of privacy policy disclosure
notices. But such notices are widely criticized as being anything but “clear and conspicuous,” as they often appear in small
type size, are lengthy, are not clearly written, and at times are
not presented with the target audience in mind (e.g., children,
older consumers) (Hoy and Andrews 2004). So, how can agencies improve the digital literacy, readability, and processing of
important online privacy information, especially with children
and teens in mind? Some studies have pointed to the superiority
of dual modality—the simultaneous presentation of a message

As originally conceived, children who can understand the
selling intent of advertising are said to have developed
“cognitive defenses” (Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg
1988; Rossiter and Robertson 1974). However, as aptly noted
by Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg (1988) and John (1999),
simply understanding the general selling intent of advertising
is not sufficient for being able to resist specific persuasive
appeals. For example, “general knowledge and beliefs about
advertising cannot be expected to dampen a child’s enthusiasm for an enticing snack or toy” (John 1999, p. 190). As
applied to our study, general knowledge about the privacy
of information may not lessen a child’s or teen’s desire to
download the latest app and/or quickly share personal information online. The cognitive defense needs to be specifically
applied to sharing decisions that children or teens make. In
addition, a child’s or teen’s knowledge about advertising or
sharing personal information online can only serve as a cognitive defense when it is accessed or activated at the time a
child/teen is viewing an ad or sharing information online (cf.
Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 1988; John 1999).
As an example, to activate knowledge from educational
films about advertising persuasion, Brucks, Armstrong, and
Goldberg (1988) used a cueing strategy for children aged 9–
10 to bolster their cognitive defenses. This cueing strategy
consisted of a five-item quiz asking children whether television
commercials make products look larger, work better, seem
more fun and exciting, make the children cooler/look better,
and make it hard to remember important things about products.
They found that over 70% of children’s counterarguments to
the commercials shown were in the high knowledge-cue present condition as opposed to other conditions in which their
cognitive defenses were not cued. Also, and in general, increasing one’s ability to process and act on knowledge through
defense strategies is more likely to lead to beliefs and attitudes
that become internalized, are relatively enduring, are more
resistant to counter persuasion, and are more likely to lead to
behavior change (Kelman 1961; Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
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In our current study, we offer the following incremental
contributions to prior cognitive defense research by examining
(1) effects beyond advertising as extended to information privacy online; (2) not only children’s and teens’ beliefs, knowledge, and/or attitudes but also their online privacy decisions;
(3) multiple age categories; (4) multiple cognitive defense strategies; and (5) and accounting for children’s and teens’ motivation to restrict what they share online. In this study, young
people’s ability to actively restrict access when sharing their
private information online is activated by either a short educational video (“Be A Smart Cookie”) or quiz with elaborated
feedback based directly on the video. Elaborated feedback
involves not only providing whether a child/teen answered the
quiz question correctly but also explaining why (Van der Kleij,
Feskens, and Eggen 2015). Researchers have found such feedback to be more effective on learning outcomes than simple
statements of whether the answer was correct (Van der Kleij,
Feskens, and Eggen 2015). Thus, we believe that the quiz with
feedback will result in greater active learning (e.g., belief
change) by children and teens about online privacy than the
video containing the exact same content or nothing at all.

Motivation and Ability (Age) to Restrict
Online Information
The Elaboration Likelihood Model, through its motivation and
ability to process dimensions, provides a valuable framework to
examine additional factors that might help a person restrict what
they share online and the effect of these factors on persuasion
and related behaviors (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; see also
Andrews 1987; Andrews and Shimp 1990; 2018; Batra and Ray
1986; MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991). Our study seeks
to tap into two of these important precursors to persuasion:
motivation and ability to restrict one’s online information.

Motivation to Restrict Online Information
For children and teens, one’s prior motivation to process and
act on information can be an important antecedent to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). That is, the personal relevance
to children and teens as to whether they should take action in
protecting and restricting their personal information is at issue.
With greater motivation, they are likely to allocate greater effort
in thinking about the consequences of sharing private information and actively place restrictions on such sharing. Those who
are more motivated to process and act on their personal information are more likely to develop beliefs and attitudes that
become internalized, are relatively enduring, are more resistant
to counter persuasion, and that are more likely to lead to behavior change (Kelman 1961; Petty and Cacioppo 1986).

The Role of Age in Ability to Process, Learning
Differences, and Reactance
An individual’s ability to process and act in restricting and
protecting their private information online has been discussed
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in terms of closing “knowledge gaps” and improving literacy
on privacy issues (Trepte et al. 2015). In general, the ability to
process and act on information is related to one’s knowledge,
skills, digital literacy, etc. As previously noted, several cognitive defense strategies will be tested to develop and enhance
children’s and teens’ privacy knowledge gaps and digital literacy. However, individual differences, such as education,
intelligence, and cognitive development as young people age
have been shown to enhance one’s ability to process information (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
For instance, research on children’s information processing
is useful for digital literacy efforts (Roedder 1981; GreganPaxton and John 1997) and proposes three stages of cognitive
development for children to separate central and incidental
material: limited (under age 8), cued (age 8–12) and strategic
(over age 12). (Other age categories were proposed by Roedder
for different activities.) Based on this research, Brucks et al.
expected that children must reach the strategic processing stage
(age 13) before they can generate spontaneous cognitive
responses. Children aged 8–12 would need a defense strategy
cue or prompt to focus their attention and counterargue. However, children under age 8 (limited category) were predicted to
be more challenged than those aged 8-12 in focusing attention
on the arguments and counterarguing. Brucks, Armstrong,
and Goldberg (1988) extended this research by showing that
advertising knowledge did not result in increased counterarguments against advertisements for the cued age group (age
9–10) unless a direct cue was present to activate that knowledge. However, based on research in child development and
digital activity (discussed subsequently), we believe that reactance and rebellion experienced at this age to follow online
privacy rules will take precedence in attenuating efforts to
restrict their sharing of private information in comparison to
older age groups.
Early adolescence (e.g., age 8–13) marks a time of serious
rebellion against parents, safety rules, and restraints, in which
young people reject their “old child identity” (Pickhardt 2009).
Such rebellion often goes against their own self-interest in
supporting their self-esteem and can lead to self-destructive
and high-risk behaviors. This is only exacerbated with
increased social media use at this age and can result in negative
consequences in this venue. Thus, as children age from more
limited knowledge and ability (e.g., from age 6–7 to 8–12),
they are likely to exhibit more reactance to rules (Brehm and
Brehm 1981) and be less motivated to restrict or limit their
private information online. Such reactance is likely to be attenuated with older children/teens due to their greater autonomy,
independence, and online experience. Older children/teens (age
13–15) also should be more “tech savvy” in their online privacy
protection due to their greater experience with apps, devices,
and online information, especially as they reach high school. In
a report for the Digital Trust Foundation, research on middle
school youth found a “7th grade technology leap” with an
“overall increase in device use and online activity” between
ages 12 and 13. At this age, friends tend to play a more important role in influencing other children/teens, and this age group
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Figure 2. Conceptual study framework: Children’s online privacy study process and key variables.

prefers to ask their friends for help about issues online rather
than ask their parents or teachers (Walker, Kiesler, and Malone
2016, pp. 22–23). Yet, at times, such independence and/or
reliance on other young people may result in misinformation
and overconfidence as children/teens age.

Research Focus, Incremental Contributions, and
Conceptual Study Framework
Thus, our study extends previous cognitive defense research
by: (1) examining a new application area (children’s information privacy), (2) including additional age categories (e.g., limited, strategic), and (3) testing multiple cognitive defense
strategies to aid online safety knowledge and the ability to
place restrictions (conditions) on personal information online.
We also believe that (4) a child’s or teen’s motivation to
actively protect their privacy online is an important factor in
the process. The process of these key variables is presented in
our conceptual study framework found in Figure 2.

Study Predictions
Considering the preceding research, we predict the following:
H1: The quiz cognitive defense treatment should lead
children and teens to (a) have more favorable beliefs
about online safety, (b) place greater importance on
restricting sharing of the YouTube (YT) video watched,
and (c) have greater willingness to restrict sharing access
to the YT video watched than the other cognitive
defense cue treatments (i.e., video, absence of a cue).

H2: Children and teens with a higher motivation to
restrict their access and sharing (in general) will have
(a) more favorable beliefs about online safety, (b)
greater understanding of the importance of restricting
the YT video watched, and (c) greater willingness to
restrict sharing access to the YT video watched than
those with a lower motivation to restrict access and
sharing (in general).
H3: The strategic (age 13–15) group should (a) have
more favorable beliefs about online safety, (b) place
greater importance on restricting sharing of the YT
video watched, and (c) have greater willingness to
restrict sharing access to the YT video watched than the
limited (age 5–6) or cued (age 8–12) groups.

Method
Pretests of Cognitive Defense Strategies and Measures
Prior to the main study, we conducted pretesting to test video
and quiz content and measures intended to aid the restriction of
information and videos shared online by children and teens. We
used a professional marketing research firm with expertise in
collecting panel data from children and teens to collect the data
online in the pretest and main study. An email solicitation to
parent panel members included the survey link, estimated survey time, and the specific minimal reward compensation (gift
card points or sweepstakes entry). Panel account information
was kept separate from general ID numbers for all data
provided. Following screening for age categories (age 6–7;
age 8–12; age 13–15), reading ability, parental consent, and
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child/teen assent, we used a pretest of 146 children and teens
split evenly across age categories and gender to test the video
and quiz content. Children/teens were randomly assigned to
either (1) a 1-minute, 17-second educational video edited from
“Be a Smart Cookie” from YouthPrivacyProtection.org3 or (2)
a seven-item true/false educational quiz (“Tips for Online Safety”; see Appendix A) based directly on information in the
video. For the quiz, children/teen respondents were then given
feedback as to whether their answer was correct and why this
was the case. Pretest results for the quiz ranged from 70.1% to
97.9% correct for the seven items. The video and quiz manipulations worked as intended, with checks measuring whether
the video/quiz said, “Every time you go online, a part of yourself is left behind” (video ¼ 95% correct; quiz ¼ 95% correct)
and “Third-party shadows follow wherever you click” (video ¼
85% correct; quiz ¼ 97% correct). Believability of the quiz and
video was measured on three seven-point scales (1 ¼ “not
believable” through 7 ¼ “believable,” 1 ¼ “not credible”
through 7 ¼ “credible,” and 1¼ “not trustworthy” through 7
¼ “trustworthy”; avideo ¼ .90; aquiz ¼ .86). Average believability of the video (x ¼ 5.97 (3.07)) and the quiz (x ¼ 5.97
(3.63)) were above the scale midpoint (4.0). Also, believability
did not vary across age categories for the video (F(2,68) ¼
.026; p ¼ .975) and quiz (F(2,68) ¼ .045; p ¼ .956). Finally,
as a check on the processing fluency of both the video and quiz
(Schwarz 2004), respondents were asked four seven-point questions (1 ¼ “tough to understand” through 7 ¼ “easy to understand,” 1 ¼ “tough to process” through 7 ¼ “easy to process,” 1 ¼
“unorganized” through 7 ¼ “organized,” and 1¼ “unclear”
through 7 ¼ “clear”; avideo ¼ .93; aquiz ¼ .81). Average processing fluency of the video (x ¼ 6.00 (4.37) and quiz (x ¼ 5.92
(4.74)) were both above the scale midpoint (4.0). In addition,
processing fluency did not vary across age categories for the video
(F(2,68) ¼ 1.64; p ¼ .202) and quiz (F(2,63) ¼ .661; p ¼ .520).

Main Study: Sample and General Procedure
The main study consisted of 513 children and teens split evenly
across the same three key age groups (6–7, 8–12, and 13–15)
and gender (50.4% female; 49.6% male). The ethnic breakdown was 68.9% Caucasian (not Hispanic), 11.9% Hispanic,
10.9% African American (not Hispanic), 4.7% Asian American, and 3.6% other ethnicities. The median category reported
for time spent online was 1–2 hours per day. The same vendor
and procedures used in collecting pretest data were used in the
main study. Those participating in the pretest were not part of
the main study. The children/teens (with parental consent and
child/teen assent) were recruited and screened for ability to
read, current availability, presence of a parent or guardian, and
parental possession of a YouTube account. Following parental
agreement to the interview, the children/teens were randomly
assigned to a cognitive defense strategy from the pretest—
3

Video clip available at https://www.youthprivacyprotection.org/cookievideo-clip.
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either the video clip on online privacy safety (see link provided
in footnote 3), the educational quiz on online privacy safety
(see Appendix A), or nothing at all (i.e., the control). The
information on online safety presented in both the video and
educational quiz cues was identical. The main study results for
the seven-item quiz ranged from 75.2% to 98.2% correct. As in
the pretest, we used processing checks to make sure participants
indeed viewed the cognitive defense strategy if they were
assigned to one (i.e., the online safety video or quiz) and watched
the YouTube video. For the main study, the video and quiz
manipulations worked as intended, with checks measuring
whether the video/quiz said, “Every time you go online, a part
of yourself is left behind” (video ¼ 90% correct; quiz ¼ 96%
correct) and “Third-party shadows follow wherever you click”
(video ¼ 75% correct; quiz ¼ 96% correct).
Children/teens were later (with parent permission) allowed
to view an age-appropriate video on YouTube that was first
selected by a parent. Before viewing the YouTube video, they
were asked if their parents restricted what they watch on YouTube. Parents were then instructed to open their YouTube
account, find an age-appropriate video for their child/teen to
watch, and step aside while the child/teen watched it and then
answered questions. After viewing the video for a maximum of
one to two minutes, we asked the children/teens filler questions
regarding what the video was and whether they liked it. A total
of 90.3% of the children/teens liked the video that was selected
for them to watch. We then asked the children/teens a key
question; i.e., whether or not they wanted to share the YouTube
video. If yes, they were asked about options for restricting who
they share the video with (e.g., with everyone, only family and
friends, only parents, no one). We then assessed their beliefs
regarding the importance of restricting who they might share
the video with, as well as five specific beliefs about online
safety that were tailored to the information presented in the
video and quiz. Finally, we measured parents’ views about
restricting their own online information and that of their teen/
child, as well as the teen’s/child’s online and app usage and
other demographic information.

Main Study: Key Independent Variables
The main study consisted of nine cells in a 3 (cognitive defense
strategy: video, quiz, or absent [control])  3 (age difference
category: limited: age 6–7, cued: age 8–12, or strategic: age
13–15) design. The total sample of 513–with 57 per cell–
offered an 88% chance of detecting a medium-sized effect
(e.g., omega-squared of .25) with a 5% estimate of error
(Cohen 1969, p. 309). We used a median split on motivation
to restrict online information (in general) to separate child/teen
respondents into high and low motivation-to-restrict groups.
This motivation to restrict online information (in general) was
a mean-centered, summated scale measured with three sevenpoint agreement items: “It is important that I restrict what I am
doing and sharing online,” “I am interested in restricting what I
am doing and sharing online,” and “I am motivated to restrict
what I am doing and sharing online” (a ¼ .90).

8

Journal of Public Policy & Marketing XX(X)

Table 1. Multivariate and Univariate Results: Online Safety Beliefs and Importance of Restricting YouTube Video Watched.
MANOVA Resultsa
Independent Variables
Main Effects
Cognitive defense strategy (CDS)
Age category (A)
Motivation (M)
Interaction effects
CDS  A
MA
CDS  M

Wilks’ l

F-Value

.93
.96
.82

8.40***
.88
51.04***

.98
.99
.99

.94
1.18
.07

Univariate Results
Partial
Online
Partial
Importance of
Partial
Eta-Squared Safety Beliefs Eta-Squared Restricting YT Video Eta-Squared
.04
.01
.18
.01
.01
.00

15.21***
1.34
91.32***
.75
1.50
.02

.06
.01
.16
.01
.01
.00

2.62*
.51
15.06***
1.06
1.94
.11

.01
.00
.03
.01
.01
.00

a

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10, N ¼ 513.
Note: Three-way interactions are nonsignificant for both dependent measures.

Main Study: Dependent Measures and Analysis
Before the children/teens watched the YouTube video selected
by their parents, we asked them if their parents restricted what
they watched on YouTube. Later, after viewing the YouTube
video, two key categorical dependent variables assessed the
teen’s/child’s decisions regarding the YouTube video they
watched. These assessed whether they would (1) share the
video (“Would you like to share the video with others?”) and,
if yes, (2) with whom (“Who would you share the video with?”;
everyone, only family and friends, only parents, no one). The
importance of the teen/child restricting with whom they might
share the video was measured on a seven-point scale (1 ¼ “not
important at all” through 7 ¼ “very important”). Also, five
specific online privacy beliefs were measured on seven-point
agreement scales: (1) “When you go online, part of you never
goes away (e.g., posts, likes, searches),” (2) “Third party ‘shadows’ see what you are doing online,” (3) “Online sites share
your information with third-party ‘shadows,’” (4) “Third-party
‘shadows’ give your information to companies that target you
(e.g., send ads to you),” and (5) “You should keep your personal information out of the hands of people who don’t know
you.” We created a mean-centered, summated scale of the
online safety beliefs (a ¼ .85).
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to
examine the impact of the independent variables on the online
safety belief and importance of restricting the YT video measures. Given overall significance, we performed follow-up
Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) contrasts in accordance with
predictions in the hypotheses. Means and standard deviations
are provided for each treatment group. We used chi-square
analysis and logistic (logit) regression for the categorical decision measures.

Results
Online Safety Beliefs
For beliefs about online safety and the importance of restricting
sharing of the YouTube video, we conducted a MANOVA to

examine the effects of the cognitive defense strategy treatment,
age categories, and motivation to restrict the exchange of
online information (in general). Table 1 displays the overall
multivariate and univariate findings for the effects of these
independent variables on the belief and importance measures.
The means and standard deviations for the independent variables appear in Table 2.
H1a predicted that the quiz cognitive defense treatment
would lead to more favorable beliefs about online safety than
the other cognitive defense cue treatments (i.e., video and
absence of a cue). In support of H1a, and as shown in Table 2,
an SNK contrast indicated that the quiz defense treatment (M ¼
6.21) led to significantly greater online safety beliefs than the
video defense treatment (M ¼ 5.84; p < .05) and the control (M
¼ 5.46; p < .05). In support of H2a, and as shown in Table 2,
those children/teens with a higher motivation to restrict sharing
(M ¼ 6.29) had significantly greater online safety beliefs than
those with lower motivation levels (M ¼ 5.31; p < .05). As
indicated in Table 2, the predictions in H3a were supported, as
the teens aged 13–15 (M ¼ 6.01) had significantly greater
online safety beliefs than the children aged 8–12 (M ¼ 5.75;
p < .05) and children aged 6–7 (M ¼ 5.61; p < .05). There
were no differences between the children aged 5–6 (M ¼ 5.50)
and the children aged 8–12 (M ¼ 5.54; p > .05). The cognitive
defense strategy findings were robust in holding within each
age group and motivation to restrict group.

Importance of Restricting the Sharing of the Specific
YouTube Video Watched
We asked the children and teens about the importance of
restricting the sharing of the specific YT video they had
watched. As indicated in Table 2, H1b was supported in part,
with the quiz cognitive defense treatment (M ¼ 5.04) leading to
a significantly greater importance of restricting the sharing of
the YT video watched than the control (M ¼ 4.51, p < .05).
However, the quiz did not lead to a significantly greater importance of restricting the YT video watched than the educational
video (M ¼ 4.75, p > .05). In support of H2b, those with a
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Table 2. Means (and SDs): Effects of Cognitive Defense Strategy
(CDS), Age (A), and Motivation (M) Conditions on Online Safety
Beliefs and Importance of Restricting the YT Video.
Online Safety
Importance of
Beliefs
Restricting YT Video
Cognitive Defense
Strategy
Control (a)
Video (b)
Quiz (c)
Age Category
Age 6–7 (a)
Age 8–12 (b)
Age 13–15 (c)
Motivation
Low (a)
High (b)

5.46 (1.26)b,c
5.84 (1.03)a,c
6.21 (0.94)a,b

4.51 (2.16)c
4.75 (1.97)
5.04 (2.01)a

5.61 (1.23)c
5.75 (1.21)c
6.01 (0.97)a,b

4.64 (2.16)
4.68 (2.02)
4.90 (2.07)

5.31 (1.08)b
6.29 (1.02)a

4.30 (1.81)b
5.20 (2.24)a

Note: Comparisons are made going down a column. Superscripts adjacent to
the means for a given column in the table indicate significant differences (p
.05 or better) according to SNK contrasts based on predictions. For example,
for the online safety beliefs column and comparing cognitive defense strategy
treatments, the superscript for the “c” cell (quiz) indicates that the online
safety belief mean is significantly greater than the means for both the control
cell labeled “a” and the video cell labeled “b.”

video (76.7%) from those who were lower in motivation to
restrict access and sharing (in general) (78.8%; (w2 (1) ¼
.286, p ¼ .59). A logistic regression did not support the
prediction in H2c of a positive relationship between motivation
to restrict sharing (in general) with the teen’s/child’s
willingness not to share the YT video (OR ¼ 1.13, p ¼ .593,
[95% CI, .72–1.77].
For age, a chi-square analysis indicated that the children age
8–12 had greater willingness to share the YT video they
watched (81.8%) than the teens aged 13–15 (72.3%) and the
children age 6–7 (79.9%), although an overall chi-square test
did not reach significance (w2 (2) ¼ 4.31, p ¼ .12). Individual
logistic regressions first revealed support for H3c, as the strategic age group of teens age 13–15 were significantly less
likely to share the YT video they watched (72.3%) than the
cued age group of children age 8–12 (81.8%; OR ¼ 1.717, p <
.05, [95% CI, .99–2.98]). However, although in the predicted
direction, the teens age 13–15 were not significantly less likely
to share the YT video they watched (72.3%) than the limited
age group of children age 6–7 (79.9%; OR ¼ .418, p ¼ .131,
[95% CI, .88–2.62]).

Setting Boundaries for Sharing (Restricting the Audience)
higher motivation to restrict access and sharing in general (M ¼
5.20) gave a significantly higher importance to restricting the
sharing of the specific YT video they watched than those with a
lower motivation to restrict access and sharing in general (M ¼
4.30, p < .05). Finally, although in the predicted direction, yet
not supporting H3b, teens age 13–15 (M ¼ 4.90) did not place a
significantly greater importance on restricting sharing of the
YT video they watched than children age 8–12 (M ¼ 4.68) or
age 6–7 (M ¼ 4.64, p >.05).

Sharing the YouTube Video watched
Children/teens were asked if (1) they would share the YouTube
video they watched and, if yes, (2) with whom. This first decision question was used to test predicted relationships in H1c
through H3c. Regarding sharing the YT video, a chi-square
analysis revealed a significant relationship between agreeing
to share the YT video watched and the cognitive defense condition (w2 (2) ¼ 6.921, p < .05; control ¼ 84%, quiz ¼ 75%,
video ¼ 72%). We then conducted logistic regression to examine the specific effects of each cognitive defense condition (vs.
the control) on children’s/teens’ willingness to share the YT
video. In partial support of H1c, the children/teens in the control
condition were significantly more likely to be willing to share
the YT video they watched than those in the quiz condition
(84% vs. 75%, odds ratio [OR] ¼ 1.755, p < .05, [95% CI,
1.02–3.02] and those in the video condition (84% vs. 72%,
OR ¼ 2.016, p < .05, [95% CI, 1.15–3.55]). However, there were
no differences between those in the quiz (75%) versus video
(72%) conditions (OR ¼ 1.15, p > .05, [95% CI, .66–2.01]).
Those who were higher in motivation to restrict sharing (in
general) were found not to differ in willingness to share the YT

Those willing to share the YT video they watched were then
asked who they were willing to share the YT video with (e.g.,
everyone, only friends and family, no one). In an examination
of the cognitive defense strategy, a chi-square analysis indicated that those in the quiz condition were more likely to share
the YT video watched with everyone (44.8%) than those in the
control (38.3%) or those exposed to the video (30.0%),
although an overall chi-square test did not reach significance
(w2 (2) ¼ 4.16, p ¼ .12). A logistic regression revealed that the
children/teens in the quiz condition were significantly more
likely to be willing to share the YT video they watched with
everyone (45.4%) than those in the video condition (30.0%;
OR ¼ 1.891, p < .05, [95% CI, 1.02–3.49]). However, there
were no differences in the likelihood of sharing with everyone
between the control (38.3%) and quiz conditions (44.8%;
OR ¼ .77, p ¼ .30, [95% CI, .46–1.27]) and between the
control (38.3%) and video conditions (30.0%; OR ¼ 1.449,
p ¼ .20, [95% CI, .81–2.58]).
Although both percentages were lower, those who were
higher in motivation to restrict their sharing (in general) were
found (somewhat surprisingly) to have a greater willingness to
share the YT video with everyone (46.0%) versus those who
were lower in motivation to restrict sharing (in general)
(31.5%; w2 (1) ¼ 7.52, p < .05). This counterintuitive result
may be due to overconfidence on the part of youth in handling
online safety themselves and through their network of friends.
A logistic regression indicated that those with higher motivation to restrict sharing (in general) were more willing to share
the YT video with everyone (46%) versus those with low motivation (31.5%) (OR ¼ .54, p < .05, [95% CI, .35–.77]).
Finally, the percentage of those who were willing to share
the YT video they watched with everyone increased with age,
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with 6- to 7-year-olds at 31.9%, 8- to 12-year-olds at 36.7%,
and 13- to 15-year-olds at 47.2% (w2 (2) ¼ 5.65, p ¼ .059). A
set of logistic regressions indicated that although there were
no differences between those aged 6–7 and 8–12 (OR ¼ 1.24,
p ¼ .44, [95% CI, .72–2.13] and those aged 8–12 and 13–15
(OR ¼ 1.54, p ¼ .11, [95% CI, .91–2.63], the willingness to
share the YT video watched with everyone was significantly
higher for those aged 13–15 (47.2%) than for those aged 6–7
(31.9%) (OR ¼ 1.91, p < .05, [95% CI, 1.10–3.31]. Again,
similar to motivation, this result may be due to overconfidence on the part of older youth in handling online safety
themselves and through their network of friends.

Effects of Parental Restrictions on YouTube
Before the children/teens watched the YouTube video, they
were asked if their parents restricted what they watched on
YouTube. Although not predicted, we sought to examine if this
measure would interact with the age categories in its effect on
online safety beliefs and the perceived importance of restricting
the sharing of the YouTube video watched. In the case of
children/teens saying that their parents restricted what they
watched on YouTube, there was an overall effect of age (F ¼
3.90, p < .05), with SNK contrasts revealing that the teens aged
13–15 (M ¼ 6.05; SD ¼ 1.03) had significantly more favorable
online safety beliefs than the children aged 6–7 (M ¼ 5.53; SD
¼ 1.24; p < .05). There were no differences for the teens aged
13–15 versus the children aged 8–12 (M ¼ 5.77; SD ¼ 1.27) or
among the age categories in the case of parents not restricting
what their children watched on YouTube. (In the latter case, the
children aged 6–7 had more favorable online safety beliefs, but
these were not significant versus other age categories.)
A similar pattern emerged for the importance of restricting
sharing of the YouTube video watched. For children/teens
indicating that their parents restricted what they watched on
YouTube, there was an effect of age (F ¼ 2.76, p < .10), with
SNK contrasts revealing that the teens aged 13–15 (M ¼ 5.29;
SD ¼ 2.08) placed significantly greater importance on restricting the sharing of the YouTube video they watched than the
children aged 6–7 (M ¼ 4.55; SD ¼ 2.19; p < .10). There were
no differences for teens aged 13–15 versus children age 8–12
(M ¼ 4.82; SD ¼ 2.06) or among the age categories in the case
of parents who did not restrict what their children watched on
YouTube. Again, in the latter case, the children aged 6–7
placed greater importance on restricting the YouTube video
they watched, but this was not significant versus other age
categories. Overall, it appears that the oldest age category
(i.e., the strategic age group, those teens aged 13–15) can be
(positively) affected by perceived parental restrictions that
have an impact on teens’ online safety beliefs and the importance of restricting the sharing of online videos watched.

Discussion
Overall, our results suggest that it is possible to empower children to protect what information (e.g., videos) they share on
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social media sites such as You Tube. Our findings depend on
the type of cognitive defense strategy employed (quiz with
feedback, educational video, or absence of a strategy), the age
group of the child (strategic, cued, and limited), their motivation to restrict sharing in general, and perceived parental
restrictions on viewing. We now summarize and discuss our
key findings.

Online Safety Beliefs
Based on the cognitive defense strategies we tested experimentally, (1) the quiz with feedback was more effective than the
educational video and (2) the video was better than the control
in influencing online safety beliefs. The strategic age group
(aged 13–15) was more likely than the cued age group (aged
8–12) to have a more favorable change in their online safety
beliefs for greater protection. We also found that those children
with a higher motivation to restrict sharing (in general) had a
more favorable change in their online safety beliefs than those
with a lower motivation to restrict sharing (in general).

Sharing Decisions
Our results indicate that the quiz with feedback and educational video conditions were significantly better in restricting
sharing than the control condition. This is important given
the relatively high percentage of children/teens willing to
share the YouTube video they watched, ranging from 72%
(video) to 75% (quiz) to 84% (control). The video was better
than the quiz when the children chose to restrict the audience
for sharing, with more in the quiz (44.8%) selecting “with
everyone” compared to the video (30.0%). We believe that
the importance of setting audience boundary restrictions
when sharing was communicated more vividly with the video
depiction of mice taking and storing the child’s cookie
crumbs (an analogy to their online information) compared
to the quiz with feedback.
Also, it appears that some overconfidence was displayed by
those who agree with the importance of restricting sharing and
for the older children/teens (aged 13–15) that had a greater
willingness to share the video with everyone. For this strategic
age category, it may be that their experience with digital
devices and online access to information has fostered a greater
focus, learning, and retention of the relevance of privacy issues
(Maccoby and Hagen 1965). Such improvement in one’s ability
to understand and process key information is an important
precursor to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). As noted
above, this finding also may be a result of overconfidence on
the part of motivated and/or older youth in handling online
safety themselves and through their network of friends. So,
even though the quiz and video were effective in enabling
protective cognitive defenses (i.e., setting boundaries on sharing), there is still ample room for development and improvement in the type and utilization of strategies employed.
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Parental Restrictions
Our results indicate that perceived parental monitoring of children’s online use can be helpful in some situations. For example, the child’s/teen’s perception of their parents restricting
their YouTube viewing positively affected their online safety
beliefs and the importance of restricting videos shared for the
strategic age group (aged 13–15) versus the limited age group
(aged 6–7). Such perception of parental monitoring of online
behaviors may help over time, with such monitoring operating
as a shared learning experience as opposed to a fear of punishment on behalf of children and teens.

Policy Implications
Our study aids regulatory and self-regulatory efforts for enhancing children’s digital literacy and their cognitive defenses in
setting boundaries for what they share online. In a broader
sense, this includes efforts to empower children to restrict
access to their personal information. For many years, federal
(e.g., FTC), state (e.g., California), and self-regulatory agencies
(e.g., Advertising Self-Regulatory Council’s CARU), as well
as companies that have websites and provide online services,
have struggled with efforts to protect children and their personal information online. Even as COPPA celebrates 20 years
of existence, challenges with ensuring verifiable parental consent and keeping up with emerging technology continue to
exist. The FTC’s goals of not only COPPA enforcement, but
also encouraging self-regulatory efforts with industry to
“streamline COPPA compliance,” has led to a six-step plan for
several approved Safe Harbor Programs (Magee 2018). The
overall purpose of this FTC-driven plan is to guide companies
through the process of protecting children online (Magee
2018). However, these efforts still focus on parental consent
and protecting/controlling the access to information gathered
by companies about and from children online. Our findings
indicate that using cognitive defense strategies, such as a simple quiz with feedback or an educational video, can help
empower children to protect themselves online.
In our study, we examined whether digital literacy knowledge was important for online safety and found that the quiz
(with elaborated feedback) was more helpful for positively
affecting children’s and teens’ online safety beliefs. With this
in mind, federal agency privacy guidelines could be offered to
nudge companies to expand online safety quizzes with feedback for children/teens to build their online safety/privacy
knowledge and beliefs. Currently, a self-regulatory effort
among leading advertising organizations (“Privacy for
America”) is focusing on data protection solutions, but it is not
yet addressing children’s privacy knowledge specifically at this
point (AAAA 2019).
When sharing decisions were the focus, especially regarding
restricting the sharing audience, the educational video was
more useful. Thus, guidelines also could promote the use of
online privacy videos aimed at children’s/teens’ online decision making (e.g., https://www.youthprivacyprotection.org
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funded by the Digital Trust Foundation). Importantly, such
videos should be accessible at the same point at which children/teens consider sharing personal information online (e.g.,
within an app on a smartphone). However, it should be noted
that both the quiz and video were better than the control condition (in which no cognitive defense strategy was provided) in
improving knowledge and decision making. Also, such expansion efforts with quizzes and videos should be tested using a
sample of children/teens. Other direct educational efforts could
be made through the FTC’s consumer website (https://www.
consumer.ftc.gov/topics/protecting-kids-online), its annual Privacy Con, and its Division of Privacy & Identity Protection.
Similar educational efforts at nonprofits (e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center) could help children’s and teen’s
online privacy knowledge and decision making.
Certainly, over the past several years, there have been many
important and well-funded educational campaigns at the federal level aimed at adolescents (e.g., the FDA’s The Real Cost
Campaign, the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign).
However, to our knowledge, such national campaigns do not
yet exist for online privacy safety and are desperately needed.
This is especially the case considering recent and significant
COPPA violations (FTC 2019; U.S. v. Muscial.ly and Musical.ly, Inc. 2019; U.S. and the Attorney General of the State of
NY v. Google LLC and YouTube LLC 2019). Considering the
Google YouTube decision, one dissenting FTC commissioner
argued for a technological “backstop” solution whereby
YouTube algorithms would help identify child-oriented content upfront and prevent behavioral advertising, rather than
relying on the self-identification by YouTube channel creators outlined in the settlement (Slaughter 2019). However,
given the millions of YouTube child channels, such a promising technological approach might be best combined with
enhancing children and teens’ cognitive defense education
before such encounters arise.
Our study also suggests slightly different (and positive)
effects of cognitive defense education depending on whether
such knowledge and/or sharing decisions are important. However, there is no doubt that challenges remain, as overconfidence seems to accrue with increases in one’s motivation to
restrict their sharing and especially with age. On a positive
note, perceived parental involvement and cognitive defense
strategies can have an impact even for the oldest, strategic
youth categories. Thus, a combination of educational defense
strategies similar to those tested in the current study, along with
an active role by parents, may be helpful in empowering children and teens to internalize online safety beliefs, be more
judicious, and utilize active privacy protective strategies when
sharing their information online.

Future Research
Because our study focused solely on enhancing children’s and
teens’ ability (empowering them) to protect their information
online through cognitive defense strategies, as well as accounting for motivation to restrict their sharing according to different
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age categories (strategic, cued, and limited), there are many
other areas of research that are warranted. For example, children’s and teen’s opportunity to restrict/share information
online could be studied by varying the amount of time it takes
to read privacy policies, or by studying the effects of whether
children/teens are free/not free from distractions (e.g., friends’
encouragement to share information; pressuring app downloads). Paying attention to such details that might affect
restricting access should be considered as part of digital literacy efforts by federal, state, and self-regulatory agencies.
In addition, the endurance of the online safety beliefs could
be tested longitudinally based on different degrees of motivation or ability to restrict information. No doubt, different types
of educational quiz and video approaches and more tailored age
measures for children/teens could be studied in the future. Also,
would older teens (e.g., aged 16–18) respond in the same fashion as the younger age groups? Other individual characteristics
for children/teens could be examined, such as gender effects in
online risk taking. For example, will male youth be more
inclined to take risks online regarding their private information
than female youth? In addition, as noted previously, there is a
real need to develop a national education campaign to enhance
and empower children and teens to protect their online privacy.
Also, would external or peripheral cues (e.g., social media
influencers) be effective in influencing online safety beliefs
and decisions to restrict online information sharing? In addition, although some efforts have been made to develop general
digital literacy scales (cf. Trepte et al. 2015), work is needed on
measures of digital literacy for youth. Another research avenue
may deal with how to address overconfidence in online privacy
protection, especially for those who might be over-reliant on
their motivation, abilities, network of friends, and/or parents to
handle their privacy protection. Finally, convenient access to
websites, platforms, and applications by children (not just sites
focused on children or advertising to children) must be
addressed to understand how to encourage active protection
strategies and parental monitoring behaviors. For example, will
such cognitive defenses and digital literacy work in the context
of popular gaming app chat rooms (Jargon 2019)? Such
research would be welcomed in helping to rebalance information power for children and teens online, and to empower children to internalize the importance of online safety and actively
restricting what they share online.

Appendix A
“Tips for Online Safety” Quiz
Please answer the following questions by marking either
“true” or “false” to the best of your knowledge about online
safety issues.
1. True or False? Every time you go online, a part of yourself is
left behind.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that every time you
go online, a part of yourself is left behind.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It
is actually TRUE that every time you go online, a part of
yourself is left behind.
The correct answer is TRUE. Every time you go online, a
part of yourself is left behind.
2. True or False? Your posts, likes, and shares will go away—
they never stick.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is FALSE that your posts,
likes, and shares will go away - they never stick.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It
is actually FALSE because your posts, likes, and shares DO
NOT go away - they DO stick.
The correct answer is FALSE. Your posts, likes, and shares
DO NOT go away they DO stick.
3. True or False? Third-party shadows follow wherever you click.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that third-party
shadows follow wherever you click.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It
is actually TRUE that third-party shadows follow wherever
you click.
The correct answer is TRUE. Third-party shadows follow
wherever you click.
4. True or False? When you log onto a website, that company
never shares your information with third parties through
secret communication.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is FALSE that when you log
onto a website, that company never shares your information
with third parties through secret communication.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one
wrong. It is actually FALSE because when you log on
to a website, that company sometimes DOES share
your information with third parties through secret
communication.
The correct answer is FALSE. When you log onto a website,
that company sometimes DOES share your information with
third parties through secret communication.
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5. True or False? Third parties are companies that take your
online information and share it with other companies often
for money.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that third parties
are companies that take your online information and share it
with other companies often for money.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It
is actually TRUE that third parties are companies that take
your online information and share it with other companies
often for money.
The correct answer is TRUE. Third parties are companies
that take your online information and share it with other
companies often for money.
6. True or False? As you give away personal information, these
companies send you ads that you may or may not wish to see.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is TRUE that as you give
away personal information, these companies send you ads
that you may or may not wish to see.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It is
actually TRUE that as you give away personal information, these
companies send you ads that you may or may not wish to see.
The correct answer is TRUE. As you give away personal
information, these companies send you ads that you may or
may not wish to see.
7. True or False? Giving companies and third parties your
personal information will help your online experience be as
secure as it can be.
True
False
Don’t Know

Response if correct: Correct! It is FALSE that giving companies and third parties your personal information will help
your online experience be as secure as it can be.
Response if incorrect: Sorry, but you got this one wrong. It
is actually FALSE because giving companies and third parties your personal information will actually REDUCE the
security of your online experience.
The answer is FALSE. Giving companies and third parties
your personal information will actually REDUCE the security of your online experience.
Great job! You completed the quiz. Now we just want to ask
you a few questions about the quiz you just took.
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